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BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD! LEGISLATING 
HOLLYWOOD 
A REGULATION THAT RESOLVES THE FILM INDUSTRY’S CONFLICT 
BETWEEN THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS. 
Christina Shu Jien Chong1 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States Department of Justice “contended that equal 
employment opportunity in the broadcast industry could ‘contribute 
significantly toward reducing . . . discrimination in other industries’ 
because of the ‘enormous impact . . . television . . . [has] upon 
American life.’”2 Courts have also recognized that 
“communities . . . ’[must] take an active interest in the . . . quality of 
[television programming because television] has a vast impact on 
their lives and the lives of their children.’”3 Unfortunately, 
Hollywood continues to promote an insular culture that excludes 
minorities from influential behind-the-camera and on-screen 
positions.4 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Christina Shu Jien Chong received her B.A. and J.D. from Berkeley Law. She is currently a 
Lecturer and the Associate Director of Academic Skills at UC Irvine, School of Law. Professor Chong 
previously taught in the academic support department at Berkeley Law and was an Assistant Professor 
at the University of San Francisco, where she managed its Academic and Bar Exam Success Program. 
Professor Chong has five years of experience working as a substantive law expert and attorney advisor 
for Themis Bar Review and is an active board member of the Conference of Asian Pacific American 
Law Faculty and Technology Editor of The Learning Curve. Prior to entering academia, Professor 
Chong was the Director of Public Programing for UC Berkeley’s Center for Latino Policy Research, 
externed for Justice Goodwin Liu at the California Supreme Court, and worked for Merlin 
Entertainments, an international hospitality company, as an Operations and Events Manager. She was 
also the Managing Editor of Berkeley Law’s Journal of Entertainment and Sports Law. 
 2. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 555 (1990) (citing Nondiscrimination Emp’t Practices 
of Broad. Licensees, 23 F.C.C.2d 430, 771 (1970)), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 
515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 3. Office of Commc’n of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
 4. Christina Shu Jien Chong, Where Are the Asians in Hollywood? Can § 1981, Title VII, 
Colorblind Pitches, and Understanding Biases Break the Bamboo Ceiling?, 21 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. 
L. J. 29, 49–50 (2016). 
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Although the government established agencies, such as the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), to ensure that networks and 
stations operate in the public’s interest, my research revealed that 
minorities are still vastly underrepresented in the film industry.5 My 
research study confirmed that minority representation remained 
nearly stagnant between 2010 and 2014 and that the white majority 
continued to dominate as directors, casting directors, screenwriters, 
actors, and actresses.6 These results suggest that America’s existing 
regulatory schemes are unable to break the cycle of bias among film 
creators and that the lack of diverse perspectives in Hollywood 
minimizes the number of casting calls seeking non-white talent and 
perpetuates the inaccurate, stereotypical portrayal of minorities.7 As a 
result, society’s members develop negative implicit biases about 
minorities that strengthen the bamboo ceiling in the film industry and 
prevented people of color from succeeding as professional artists.8 
The courts believe that “communities throughout 
the . . . country . . . must bear [the] final responsibility for the quality 
and adequacy of television service” and that members of the “public 
[should not] feel . . . [that] they are unduly interfering in the private 
business affairs of others” because the public has a direct interest in 
television programming.9 However, recent decisions, such as 
Claybrooks v. ABC and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, suggest 
that courts sometimes fail to recognize the public’s desire to promote 
antidiscrimination in employment and diversity, especially when 
these interests conflict with an individual’s freedom of expression.10 
This article urges the public to hold Congress and the judiciary 
responsible for ensuring children are exposed to a diverse portrayal 
of minority experiences on screen and providing minorities with the 
equal opportunity to earn a reasonable living in entertainment—
                                                                                                                 
 5. Office of Commc’n of United Church of Christ, 359 F.2d at 1003. See generally Chong, supra 
note 3. 
 6. Chong, supra note 3, at 31–33, 70. 
 7. Id. at 38. 
 8. Id. at 69. 
 9. Office of Commc’n of United Church of Christ, 359 F.2d at 1003. 
 10. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240–41 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring); Claybrooks v. Am. Broad. Co., 898 F. Supp. 2d 986, 999–1000 (M.D. Tenn. 2012). 
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America’s most influential industry. Our judges need more direction 
from Congress to establish a precedent that properly balances our 
country’s First Amendment and antidiscrimination values because, 
currently, the courts are failing to stop discrimination in Hollywood 
despite Congress’s passage of Title VII and § 1981.11 Entertainment 
leaders also need congressional guidance because the industry has 
not eliminated its improper practices through self-regulation.12 Thus, 
this article presents a legislative solution that can reduce the film 
industry’s prejudicial actions without interfering with artists’ right to 
express their views. 
Part I reviews the regulatory history of the broadcast, cable, and 
film industries.13 This section also uses statistics to explain why 
legislative action is necessary to promote nonstereotypical 
appearances of minorities in films and employment of minorities in 
front of and behind the camera.14 Part II examines the 
constitutionality of a content-based regulation that requires casting 
calls to be race neutral.15 This section argues that casting calls with a 
preference for actors or actresses of a particular race constitute 
unlawful speech under Title VII, and similar to obscene and 
commercial speech, these discriminatory employment advertisements 
deserve minimal or no protection under the First Amendment.16 
Thus, even if no legislation is passed, Hollywood’s current hiring 
practices are illegal. Part III argues that even if the Supreme Court of 
the United States applies strict scrutiny, the regulation is 
constitutional because eliminating discriminatory casting calls serves 
the compelling government interests of (1) protecting a minority’s 
right to earn a living in Hollywood and (2) shielding America’s 
children from developing implicit biases after constant exposure to 
the discriminatory portrayals of minorities on screen.17 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Chong, supra note 3, at 53, 56. 
 12. Id. at 66–67. 
 13. See infra Part I. 
 14. See infra Part I. 
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. See infra Part II. 
 17. See infra Part III. 
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I.   The Broadcast, Cable, and Film Industries 
Although free speech absolutists claim that regulating the 
entertainment industry violates the First Amendment, past regulatory 
actions by the legislative and judicial branches suggest otherwise.18 
This section provides a brief overview and history of the regulations 
in the broadcast and cable industries that are relevant to this article 
and explains why legislative action is necessary. 
A.   An Overview of the Broadcast and Cable Industries 
Broadcast television (TV), also known as over-the-air broadcasting 
or terrestrial TV, began in 1927 and is an industry where networks 
deliver programs to the public for free.19 The networks transmit TV 
signals by radio waves to a receiver, such as an antenna.20 Because 
the radio frequency spectrum is limited, most governments require a 
station license to prevent networks from broadcasting over each 
other’s airwaves.21 Broadcast TV was the only method of TV 
delivery until cable TV was popularized in the 1950s.22 The major 
networks in the United States are ABC, CBS, Fox, and NBC.23 
Unlike broadcast TV, cable TV is a system where programs are 
delivered through coaxial cables to individual receivers of paying 
subscribers.24 Cable operators, such as AT&T and Comcast, deliver 
programming from four sources: (1) retransmission of broadcast 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Chong, supra note 3, at 56. 
 19. David E. Fisher et al., Television, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/technology/television-technology [perma.cc/8J28-SJJ2] (last visited Nov. 1, 
2018). 
 20. Id.; What Is the Difference Between Broadcast and Cable Television?, I AGREE TO SEE, 
http://www.iagreetosee.com/faq/what-is-the-difference-between-broadcast-and-cable-television/ 
[https://perma.cc/GM8R-FB9R] (last visited Mar. 22, 2017). 
 21. STEVEN WALDMAN, THE INFORMATION NEEDS OF COMMUNITIES 276 (2011), 
https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/the-information-needs-of-communities-report-july-2011.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2PNK-7USW]. 
 22. Lydia Boyd, Brief History of the Television History, AD*ACCESS, 
https://library.duke.edu/specialcollections/scriptorium/adaccess/tv-history.html [https://perma.cc/JM9J-
ZR3X] (last visited Nov. 1, 2018). 
 23. TV Broadcast & Cable Networks Industry Insights From D&B Hoovers, D&B HOOVERS, 
http://www.hoovers.com/industry-facts.tv-broadcast-cable-networks.1470.html (last visited Mar. 22, 
2017). 
 24. What Is the Difference Between Broadcast and Cable Television?, supra note 19. 
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stations; (2) programs purchased from cable networks, such as ESPN, 
Fox News, USA, TBS, and Disney; (3) programs created by the cable 
operator itself; and (4) programs on third-party and government-
owned access channels.25 The program sources for each network vary 
but are usually produced by independent companies, such as Viacom, 
CBS, NBCUniversal, Time Warner, Twenty-First Century Fox, 
Disney, and British Broadcasting Corporation Worldwide.26 
B.   Regulation of the Broadcast Industry 
Early regulation of the entertainment industry suggests that 
Congress did not view the freedom of speech as an unlimited right.27 
Instead, Congress feared that without governmental control “the 
public interest might be subordinated to monopolistic domination in 
the broadcasting field.”28 Similarly, the Supreme Court believes that 
the medium of broadcast has the “special characteristic” of scarcity, 
which “calls for more exacting regulation.”29 In recent years, over-
the-air broadcasting has transitioned to delivering TV signals via 
cable or satellite, but the government still regulates the broadcast 
industry to ensure efficiency and diversity.30 This section discusses 
the powers of the FCC and how its history suggests that the 
entertainment industry is subject to regulation. 
1.   The Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications Act of 1934 
To prevent chaos over radio frequencies, the Radio Act of 1927 
created a unified and comprehensive regulatory system for the 
broadcast industry and the Federal Radio Commission (FRC).31 The 
Radio Act of 1927 gave the FRC the power to deny licenses to 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 787–88 (1996). 
 26. Who Owns What on Television?, NEATORAMA (July 7, 2008, 3:13 AM), 
https://www.neatorama.com/2008/07/07/who-owns-what-on-television/ [https://perma.cc/G2KZ-28NE]. 
 27. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943). 
 28. Id. at 219. 
 29. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 375 (1984). 
 30. Bethany M. Burns, Reforming the Newspaper Industry: Achieving First Amendment Goals of 
Diversity Through Structural Regulation, 5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 61, 62–63 (1997). 
 31. Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 212–13. 
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stations that made exclusivity agreements with networks, which is an 
example of Congress approving indirect regulation of private 
dealings.32 
TV became available in the late 1920s,33 but Congress did not 
replace the FRC with the FCC until the Communications Act of 
1934.34 The Communications Act authorizes the FCC to regulate the 
radio and TV industries and requires the FCC to grant broadcasting 
licenses that are in the “public convenience, interest, or necessity.”35 
Although the FCC cannot edit broadcasts that it deems 
inappropriate, it can review the content of past and future broadcasts 
through the license-renewal36 and license-granting processes.37 When 
granting initial licenses, the FCC can forecast the station’s 
performance, but when analyzing renewals, the FCC must focus on 
the broadcaster’s past actions.38 If a broadcaster failed to promote 
operations and programs that furthered the public interest of its 
listeners then the FCC can deny the broadcaster’s renewal 
application.39 
Currently, the FCC’s licensing power is broad and applies to both 
noncommercial and commercial broadcasters40; its powers are not 
limited to the engineering and technical aspects of regulating 
frequencies, hours, and licensees.41 For example, the FCC does not 
have unfettered censorship power over broadcast communications,42 
but it can regulate the broadcast of obscene, indecent, or profane 
language.43 Congress’s decision to provide vast powers to the FCC 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Id. at 200–01. 
 33. Fisher, supra note 18. 
 34. Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 217. 
 35. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2018); Federal Communications Commission, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Communications_Commission [https://perma.cc/SE7A-DZ54] 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2017). 
 36. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 737 (1978). 
 37. Office of Commc’n of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 216; Office of Commc’n of United Church of Christ, 359 F.2d at 
1003, 1007. 
 40. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 367 (1984). 
 41. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2018); Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 215. 
 42. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (2018). 
 43. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 737 (1978). 
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suggests an effort to regulate an industry that was dominated by the 
majority and excluded minority viewpoints. 
2.   The FCC’s Employment and Diversity Goals 
In addition to using its licensing powers to further the public’s 
interest, the FCC promotes three basic concepts in its regulatory 
decisions to encourage diversity: (1) nondiscrimination in 
employment, (2) affirmative action, and (3) proper discovery of 
community problems.44 Despite the FCC’s explicit efforts to 
encourage diversity, Hollywood still remains dominated by the 
majority,45 which further supports the idea that legislative attention is 
necessary. This section discusses the three FCC diversity goals and 
explains how the FCC’s efforts, although valiant, have not been 
enough to change Hollywood. 
a)   Nondiscrimination in Employment 
“[F]rom the outset, . . . the [FCC] has recognized that the public 
interest is not served by licensees who engage in intentional 
employment discrimination.”46 The FCC requires that no person be 
denied employment or related benefits on the grounds of his or her 
race, color, religion, national origin, or sex.47 
The FCC also analyzes employment practices of licensees “to the 
extent those practices affect the obligation of the licensee to provide 
programing that ‘fairly reflects the tastes and the viewpoints of 
minority groups.’”48 A licensee’s disproportionate employment of 
minorities, “standing alone, does not necessarily present an issue 
warranting exploration in an evidentiary hearing.”49 But, a “highly 
                                                                                                                 
 44. La. Television Broad. Corp., 53 F.C.C.2d 561, 562–63 (1975). 
 45. Chong, supra note 4, at 28. 
 46. Bilingual Bicultural Coal. on Mass Media, Inc. v. FCC, 595 F.2d 621, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 47. La. Television Broad. Corp., 53 F.C.C.2d at 563. The FCC examines the broadcaster’s past 
employment practices to determine if there is (1) a pattern of intentional discrimination that would 
seriously put into question the licensee’s character qualifications to remain a licensee and (2) intentional 
discrimination, which would almost invariably disqualify a broadcast from a position of public 
trusteeship. Bilingual Bicultural Coal., 595 F.2d at 629. 
 48. Bilingual Bicultural Coal., 595 F.2d at 628. 
 49. La. Television Broad. Corp., 53 F.C.C.2d at 563. 
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disproportionate representation of minorities and women employed 
by a licensee in relation to their presence in the population or 
workforce may constitute evidence of discriminatory practices.”50 At 
first glance, the FCC’s current scheme appears to protect minorities 
and promote equal opportunity in employment, but my study of 
Hollywood, which is discussed in Section D, indicates that unfair 
hiring procedures still exist in the industry.51 
b)   Affirmative Action 
The FCC “requires licensees to make additional efforts to recruit, 
employ[,] and promote qualified members of minority and women 
groups.”52 If a licensee’s “employment profile falls below a zone of 
reasonableness, the licensee must modify or supplement its 
recruitment practices and policies by vigorous and systematic efforts 
to locate and encourage the candidacy of qualified minorities and 
women.”53 For example, the licensee must eliminate recruitment 
activities that perpetuate hiring schemes that rely upon personal 
contacts and friendships, a hiring practice that often benefits 
nonminority males and often excludes minorities and women.54 
Many companies have diversity initiatives to promote inclusivity, but 
these diversity hiring programs have become more of a marketing 
scheme than a legitimate pipeline program to leadership positions in 
Hollywood,55 which means there is minimal movement of minorities 
into top positions in the film industry. 
c)   Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by 
Broadcast Applicants 
A broadcast licensee’s response to the conflicting needs of the 
groups in its service area remains largely within its discretion, but it 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Id. 
 51. See infra Part I.D. 
 52. La. Television Broad. Corp., 53 F.C.C.2d at 563. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Chong, supra note 3, at 66. 
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cannot “flatly ignore a strongly expressed need.”56 Although there is 
no requirement that the station devote 20% of its airtime to needs 
expressed by 20% of its viewing public, the licensee must act 
reasonably.57 If a licensee is unable to adequately serve the needs of 
both the majority and minorities in its service area, then its renewal 
application will be denied unless the licensee can prove it made 
“reasonable efforts” to broadcast programs of particular interest to 
minorities.58 
The FCC’s Ascertainment Policy recognizes that “[g]roups with 
the greatest problems may be the least organized and have [the] 
fewest recognized spokesmen.”59 Thus, additional efforts are 
necessary to identify their leaders and establish a dialogue to 
ascertain their problems and interests.60 Broadcasters can satisfy this 
requirement by conducting a random sample of the general public or 
meeting with community leaders, but questionnaires and preprinted 
forms cannot be used in lieu of personal connections.61 
The FCC has never held that the needs of a minority group may 
only be satisfied by programs designed specifically for that group.62 
A wider range of appeal can suffice to satisfy the licensee’s 
obligation of service to demographic minorities, but the broadcast 
industry cannot accept that appeal to general tastes, intellects, 
problems, needs, and interests is the only way programing decisions 
should be made.63 The FCC encourages broadcasters to consider the 
needs of minorities64 by expressly including “minority and ethnic 
groups” as segments of the community that licensees are expected to 
consult.65 However, despite this explicit, regulated, and recognized 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Stone v. FCC, 466 F.2d 316, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 57. Id. For example, “[a] station should be ready, able, and willing to serve the needs of the local 
community by broadcasting such outstanding local events as community concerts, civic meetings, [and] 
local sports events . . . .” Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 203 (1943). 
 58. Ala. Educ. Television Comm’n, 50 F.C.C.2d 461, 473 (1974). 
 59. WGN of Colo., Inc., 31 F.C.C.2d 413, 420 (1971). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Stone, 466 F.2d at 326. 
 62. Ala. Educ. Television Comm’n, 50 F.C.C.2d at 473. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 587 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Ala. Educ. Television Comm’n, 50 F.C.C.2d at 473. 
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ascertainment program run by the FCC, decision-making positions 
still lack minority representation, minorities are often placed in 
menial jobs, and stations have low minority employment statistics.66 
To increase the number of minorities on screen, Hollywood needs 
more representation behind-the-scenes. The FCC is trying to make 
the industry diverse through its three explicit policies, but it has been 
unsuccessful,67 which is why this article argues for more concrete 
regulation of the entertainment industry. 
C.   Regulation of the Cable and Film Industries 
Some people might argue that allowing regulation of the broadcast 
industry does not mean that the cable and film industries can also be 
regulated, but this argument fails because local governments 
currently regulate cable operators’ rights and obligations through 
franchise authorities that control access to public rights-of-way and 
easements related to the laying of cable lines.68 Local franchising 
agreements were the first form of cable regulation and began in the 
1960s,69 and today, the federal government still requires these 
franchise agreements.70 In 1972, Congress explicitly required cable 
operators to reserve 10%–15% of their channels for commercial lease 
to unaffiliated third parties.71 The leased access channels created 
another avenue for programmers, who would otherwise be excluded 
from cable, to express their views.72 Congress also required operators 
to set aside channels for public, educational, and government 
programming (PEG channels).73 Local governments often hired an 
access channel manager—usually a nonprofit organization—that 
prescreened programming, promulgated rules for use of the PEG 
channels, and dealt with any issues arising from programming; this 
locally accountable body, not the cable operators, had editorial 
                                                                                                                 
 66. WGN of Colo., Inc., 31 F.C.C.2d 413, 415 (1971). 
 67. Chong, supra note 3, at 30. 
 68. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 788 (1996). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 789. 
 72. Id. at 743. 
 73. Id. at 760. 
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control.74 On leased and PEG channels, federal law prohibited the 
cable operator from exercising any control over program content 
until 1992, when Congress allowed operators to prohibit the 
broadcasting of indecent programs.75 These are all examples of 
Congress allowing regulation of the cable industry to promote 
diversity. Unfortunately, this minimal regulation has not been enough 
to garner any significant change. 
As for the film industry, its leaders must still abide by general tort, 
contract, intellectual property, and employment regulations, such as 
Title VII and copyright laws.76 Similar to the broadcast industry, 
Congress has suggested that cable and film companies do not have 
unfettered discretion to operate their businesses and must consider 
diversity and excluded groups in their programming.77 The question 
is whether current regulation is enough. This article argues, “No.” 
D.   Studies that Prove a Lack of Diversity in the Film Industry 
Still Exists 
Congress has regulated entertainment via the broadcast and cable 
industry for almost 100 years,78 but more regulation is necessary 
because our TV and movie casts still lack diversity. The disparity in 
representation suggests that current regulation of the cable, broadcast, 
and film industries is not enough because representation has not 
reached parity. This section provides two examples of 
underrepresentation of minorities despite the existence of current 
regulations: (1) ownership of broadcast stations and (2) 
representation in movies and broadcast television behind the camera 
and on screen. 
                                                                                                                 
 74. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms., 518 U.S. at 761. 
 75. Id. at 760. 
 76. Ferrill v. Parker Grp., Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 474 (11th Cir. 1999); Paige Zandri, Lights, 
Camera . . . Litigation?: Film Industry Law, PRIORI LEGAL (June 13, 2014), 
https://www.priorilegal.com/blog/film-industry-law [https://perma.cc/KZ7M-NRZ3]. 
 77. Congress Members Weigh in on Diversity in Hollywood, MULTICULTURAL MEDIA CAUCUS 
(June 7, 2017), https://multiculturalmediacaucus-clarke.house.gov/congress-members-weigh-in-on-
diversity-in-hollywood/ [https://perma.cc/2RVY-A2EA]. 
 78. Anne P. Jones & Harry W. Quillan, Broadcasting Regulation: A Very Brief History, 37 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 107, 107 (1985). 
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1.   Ownership of Broadcast Stations 
In 1968, Congress recognized that “the most valuable broadcast 
licenses were assigned many years ago” and determined that the 
comparative hearings at the renewal stages were “an important 
opportunity for excluded groups . . . to gain entry into the industry.”79 
However, despite Congress’s push for diversity and its creation of the 
FRC in 1927 and the FCC in 1934, by 1971—almost forty years 
later—minorities still only owned ten of the approximately 7,500 
radio stations in the country and none of the 1,000+ television 
stations.80 In an effort to increase minority representation, the FCC 
promulgated equal-employment-opportunity regulations through 
“formal ‘ascertainment’ rules.”81 
In 1978, eight years after the FCC enacted its ascertainment policy, 
the views of racial minorities continued to be inadequately 
represented in the broadcast media.82 Minorities still owned less than 
1% of the nation’s radio and television stations.83 The FCC 
determined that additional measures were needed to include more 
minority voices.84 In May 1978, the FCC adopted the Statement of 
Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities 
(Statement).85 The FCC historically maintained a race-neutral policy 
when assigning licenses because minority ownership did not 
necessarily mean that the owner would broadcast minority 
programs,86 but Congress acknowledged that the FCC’s race-neutral 
alternatives had failed to achieve necessary programming and 
approved the Statement.87 Prior to passing the Statement, Congress 
                                                                                                                 
 79. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 573 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 80. Id. at 553. 
 81. Id. at 586. The regulations required broadcasters “‘to ascertain the problems, needs[,] and 
interests of the residents of his community of license . . . and to specify ‘what broadcast matter he 
proposes to meet those problems, needs and interests.’” Id. (quoting Primer on Ascertainment of Cmty. 
Problems by Broad. Applicants, 27 F.C.C.2d 650, 682 (1971)). 
 82. Id. at 588. 
 83. Id. at 553. 
 84. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 588. 
 85. Id. at 556. 
 86. Id. at 555. 
 87. Id. at 589–90. 
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conducted a study that revealed that “the effects of past inequities 
stemming from racial and ethnic discrimination have resulted in a 
severe underrepresentation of minorities in the media of mass 
communications.”88 Congress justified the minority ownership 
policies of the FCC not as “remedies for victims of this 
discrimination” but “primarily to promote programming diversity” 
and urged that “diversity is an important governmental objective that 
can serve as a constitutional basis for the [FCC’s] preference 
policies.”89 The Supreme Court agreed.90 Representative Van Deerlin 
explained that “the most effective way to reach the inadequacies of 
the broadcast industry in employment and programming would be by 
doing something at the top, that is, increasing minority ownership 
and management and control in broadcast stations.”91 
The Statement (1) pledged to consider minority ownership in the 
proceedings for new licenses as a plus and (2) created a distress-sale 
policy that allowed licensees under review by the FCC to assign their 
licenses to an FCC-approved minority enterprise.92 Under the 
distress-sale policy, the assignee must be comprised of at least 50% 
minority ownership, the sale price for the licensee must not exceed 
more than 75% of the fair-market value, and the assignee must 
purchase the licensee before the hearing.93 This “congressional 
[support] showed [a] clear recognition of the extreme 
underrepresentation of minorities and their perspectives in the 
broadcast mass media.”94 
In addition to the Statement, in 1981, Congress authorized a lottery 
procedure that randomly selected an application from a pool of 
qualified applicants in the selection process for an initial license and 
construction permit.95 The procedure gave “significant” preferences 
in the lottery process to groups that were underrepresented in the 
                                                                                                                 
 88. Id. at 566. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 566. 
 91. Id. at 574. 
 92. Id. at 556–58. 
 93. Id. at 557–58. 
 94. Id. at 560–61. 
 95. Id. at 575–76. 
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ownership of telecommunications facilities and whose selection 
would increase the diversification of mass media ownership and 
programming offered to the public.96 Unfortunately, in 1986, 
minorities owned only 2.1% of the more than 11,000 radio and 
television stations in the United States—a mere 1% increase since 
1978.97 Congress explicitly endorsed the FCC’s diversity policies, 
but progress was still slow.98 Moreover, the 2.1% statistic failed to 
reflect that, as late entrants to the industry, minorities often obtained 
less valuable stations and only served geographically limited markets 
with relatively small audiences.99 
By 1990, the Court recognized that for the past two decades, 
minorities constituted at least one-fifth of the United States 
population, but very few members of the minority groups held 
broadcasting licenses.100 It is now 2018—almost sixty years after our 
nation began its efforts to produce sufficient diversity in 
programming.101 Representation has improved but not significantly 
enough.102 This article argues that our country has focused its efforts 
on increasing ownership statistics of the distributors without realizing 
that the majority also dominates the leadership positions responsible 
for creating a film’s content. As a result, the films available to 
broadcast owners are mostly created by writers, directors, and 
producers with a majority perspective using mainly white actors and 
actresses, which leads to a small selection of diverse films for 
broadcast stations and cable networks. 
2.   Underrepresentation Behind the Camera and On Screen 
In 2014, my research study recorded the race of 2,394 actors and 
actresses cast in 500 popular films over a span of five years (2010 to 
2014).103 The annual sample of films included the top twenty-five 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 575–76. 
 97. Id. at 553. 
 98. Id. at 578. 
 99. Id. at 553–54. 
 100. Id. at 553. 
 101. Id. at 585. 
 102. Chong, supra note 3, at 44. 
 103. Id. at 32. 
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movies grossing over $40 million during opening weekend, the top 
twenty-five movies grossing under $40 million during opening 
weekend, the top twenty-five television shows with over 2 million 
viewers, and the top twenty-five television shows with under 2 
million viewers.104 The rankings for the movies and television shows 
were collected from boxofficemojo.com,105 deadline.com,106 and 
tvbythenumbers.zap2it.com.107 
                                                                                                                 
 104. Id. 
 105. 2010 Domestic Grosses, BOX OFFICE MOJO, 
http://www.boxofficemojo.com/yearly/chart/?view=releasedate&view2=domestic&yr=2010&sort=open
gross&order=DESC&p=.htm [https://perma.cc/XM6H-M25N] (last visited Feb. 20, 2016); 2011 
Domestic Grosses, BOX OFFICE MOJO, http://www.boxofficemojo.com/yearly/chart/? 
view=releasedate&view2=domestic&yr=2011&sort=opengross&order=DESC&p=.htm 
[https://perma.cc/Q6KC-ZYPF] (last visited Feb. 20, 2016); 2012 Domestic Grosses, BOX OFFICE 
MOJO, http://www.boxofficemojo.com/yearly/chart/?view=releasedate&view2=domestic&yr=2012 
&sort=opengross&order=DESC&p=.htm [https://perma.cc/CY6S-B4LX] (last visited Feb. 20, 2016); 
2013 Domestic Grosses, BOX OFFICE MOJO, http://www.boxofficemojo.com/yearly/chart/? 
view=releasedate&view2=domestic&yr=2013&sort=opengross&order=DESC&p=.htm 
[https://perma.cc/WL5Y-G3YC] (last visited Feb. 20, 2016); 2014 Domestic Grosses, BOX OFFICE 
MOJO, http://www.boxofficemojo.com/yearly/chart/?view=releasedate&view2=domestic&yr=2014& 
sort=opengross&order=DESC&p=.htm [https://perma.cc/59VF-A4CN] (last visited Feb. 20, 2016). 
 106. Nellie Andreeva, Full Series Rankings for the 2009–10 Broadcast Season, DEADLINE (May 27, 
2010, 11:49 PM), http://deadline.com/2010/05/full-series-rankings-for-the-2009-10-broadcast-season-
44277/ [https://perma.cc/9SUJ-X62Y]; Nellie Andreeva, Full 2010–2011 TV Season Series Rankings, 
DEADLINE (May 27, 2011, 10:56 AM), http://deadline.com/2011/05/full-2010-11-season-series-rankers-
135917/ [https://perma.cc/ E26N-BQE8]; Nellie Andreeva, Full 2011–2012 TV Season Series Rankings, 
DEADLINE (May 24, 2012, 11:10 PM), http://deadline.com/2012/05/full-2011-2012-tv-season-series-
rankings-277941/ [https://perma.cc/VV8S-AL3S]; Full 2013–2014 TV Season Series Rankings, 
DEADLINE (May 22, 2014, 4:40 PM), https://deadline.com/2014/05/tv-season-series-rankings-2013-full-
list-2-733762/ [https://perma.cc/JYX3-MSUS]. 
 107. 2010–11 Season Broadcast Primetime Show Viewership Averages, TV BY NUMBERS (June 1, 
2011), http://tvbythenumbers.zap2it.com/2011/06/01/2010-11-season-broadcast-primetime-show-
viewership-averages/94407 [https://perma.cc/6WH-22PU]; Complete List of 2011–12 Season TV Show 
Ratings: ‘Sunday Night Football’ Tops, Followed by ‘American Idol,’ ‘The Voice’ & ‘Modern Family,’ 
TV BY NUMBERS (May 24, 2012), http://tvbythenumbers.zap2it.com/2012/05/24/final-list-of-2011-12-
season-tv-show-ratings-sunday-night-football-tops-followed-by-american-idol-the-voice-modern-
family/135747/ [https://perma.cc/377A-M5KL]; Complete List of 2012–13 Season TV Show 
Viewership: ‘Sunday Night Football’ Tops, Followed by ‘NCIS,’ ‘The Big Bang Theory & ‘NCIS: Los 
Angeles,’ TV BY NUMBERS (May 29, 2013), http://tvbythenumbers.zap2it.com/2013/05/29/complete-
list-of-2012-13-season-tv-show-viewership-sunday-night-football-tops-followed-by-ncis-the-big-bang-
theory-ncis-los-angeles/184781/ [https://perma.cc/VT24-LDHC]. 
 The research study used the following parameters. Lead roles in movies included actors 
and actresses whose pictures appeared on the published movie poster. Supporting roles in 
movies included actors and actresses who were listed in the Wikipedia starring section, but 
did not appear on the movie poster. Lead roles in broadcast television included actors and 
actresses who appeared in 90% of the episodes over the lifetime of the series. Supporting 
roles included actors or actresses who appeared in 75–90% of the episodes over the 
lifetime of the series. The race data for lead and supporting roles for movies and television 
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The overall results revealed that whites occupied 83.5% of lead 
roles while minorities occupied 16.5%—9.5% black, 2% Latino, 
2.5% Asian, 0.5% Native American, and 2% Mixed/Other.108 For 
supporting roles, whites were 85% and minorities were 15%—7% 
black, 2.5% Latino, 3.5% Asian, 0% Native American, and 2% 
Mixed/Other.109 In both categories, the minority representation was 
extremely low compared to the U.S. population.110 
 
In the movies category for on-screen roles, whites occupied 84% 
of lead roles while minorities occupied 16%— 9% black, 2% Latino, 
2% Asian, 0% Native American, and 3% Mixed/Other.111 For 
supporting roles, whites were 83% and minorities were 17%— 8% 
                                                                                                                 
shows were collected through various online resources, such as IMDb, Wikipedia, movie 
and TV webpages, news articles, and the network’s webpages. 
Chong, supra note 3, at 32–33. 
 108. Chong, supra note 3, at 33. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Annual Estimates of the Resident Population by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin for the United 
States, States, and Counties: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2014, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION DIV., 
(June 2015), https://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/PEP/2014/PEPSR6H 
[https://perma.cc/8GBC-YZHT] [hereinafter Annual Estimates of the Resident Population]. 


















White 77.36% 83.5% +6.14 85% +7.64 
Black 13.22% 9.5% -3.72 7% -6.22 
Latino 17.37% 2% -15.37 2.5% -14.87 
Asian 5.62% 2.5% -3.12 3.5% -2.12 
Native 
American 1.24% 0.5% -0.74 0% -1.24 
Mixed/Other N/A 2% N/A 2% N/A 
Unknown N/A 0% N/A 0% N/A 
Total 
Minorities 23% 16.5% -6.5 15% -8.00 
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White 77.36% 84% +6.64 83% +5.64 
Black 13.22% 9% -4.22 8% -5.22 
Latino 17.37% 2% -15.37 3% -14.37 
Asian 5.62% 2% -3.62 3% -2.62 
Native 
American 
1.24% 0% -1.24 0% -1.24 
Mixed/ 
Other 
N/A 3% N/A 3% N/A 
Unknown N/A 0% N/A 0% N/A 
Total 
Minorities 
23% 16% -7.00 17% -6.00 
 
In the television category, minorities fared slightly better. Whites 
occupied 81% of lead roles while minorities occupied 19%—10% 
black, 2% Latino, 3% Asian, 1% Native American, and 3% 
Mixed/Other.113 For supporting roles, whites were 83% and 
minorities were 17%—6% black, 2% Latino, 4% Asian, 0% Native 




                                                                                                                 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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White 77.36% 81% +3.64 83% +5.64 
Black 13.22% 10% -3.22 6% -7.22 
Latino 17.37% 2% -15.37 2% -15.37 
Asian 5.62% 3% -2.62 4% -1.62 
Native 
American 1.24% 1% -0.24 0% -1.24 
Mixed/ 
Other N/A 3% N/A 5% N/A 
Unknown N/A 0% N/A 0% N/A 
Total 
Minorities 23% 19% -4.00 17% -6.00 
 
My research study also recorded the race of 417 directors, 580 
casting directors, and 691 screenwriters from 2010 to 2014 using the 
same 500 films mentioned above.115 The results revealed 94.5% of 
directors were white and 15.5% were minorities—2.5% black, 1.5% 
Latino, 1% Asian, and 0% Native American.116 For casting directors, 
the results revealed 92.5% were white, 5.5% were Unknown, and 2% 
were minorities— 1% black, 0.5% Latino, 0.5% Asian, and 0% 
Native American.117 For screenwriters, 95% were white and 5% were 
minorities—1.5% black, 2.5% Latino, 1% Asian, 0% Native 
American, and 0.5% Mixed/Other.118 Similar to on-screen roles, the 
minority representation was extremely low compared to the U.S. 
population.119 
 
                                                                                                                 
 115. Id. at 33–34. 
 116. Id. at 34. 
 117. Chong, supra note 3, at 34. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Annual Estimates of the Resident Population, supra note 109. 
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In the movies category for behind-the-scenes positions, 92% of 
directors were white and 8% were minorities—4% black, 1% Latino, 
2% Asian, 0% Native American, and 0% Mixed/Other.120 For casting 
directors, the results revealed 85% were white, 11% were Unknown, 
and 4% were minorities—2% black, 1% Latino, 1% Asian, 0% 
Native American, and 0% Mixed/Other.121 For screenwriters, 95% 
                                                                                                                 
 120. Chong, supra note 3, at 34. 
 121. Id. 
19
Chong: Back to the Drawing Board! Legislating Hollywood
Published by Reading Room, 2019
624 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:3 
were white and 5% were minorities—2% black, 2% Latino, 1% 






































































In the television shows category for behind-the-scenes positions, 
97% of directors were white and 3% were minorities—1% black, 2% 
Latino, 0% Asian, 0% Native American, and 0% Mixed/Other.123 For 
casting directors, the results revealed 100% were white and 0% were 
                                                                                                                 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
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minorities.124 For screenwriters, 95% were white and 5% were 
minorities—1% black, 3% Latino, 1% Asian, 0% Native American, 
and 0% Mixed/Other.125 
 
TV SHOWS RESULTS 
Behind-the-Camera Representation 

































































Finally, my research updated Russell Robinson’s 2007 casting-call 
numbers by analyzing the specific race of 488 casting calls on 
backstage.com from January 2015 to May 2015.126 The results were 
                                                                                                                 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Chong, supra note 3, at 43. 
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similar to Robinson’s 2007 statistics on IMDb with 39% white, 10% 
black, 11% Latino, 4% Asian, 2% Native American or Middle 
Eastern, 8% multiple races specified, and 26% race not specified.127 
According to industry standards, race not specified means “white.”128 
Thus, the final statistics were 65% white.129 Although the industry 
improved since 2007, whites still received sixteen times more 
employment opportunities than minorities in film.130 
 
CASTING CALLS 






65% 10% 11% 4% 2% 8% 
 
Where Are the Asians in Hollywood? revealed that after more than 
fifty years of attempting to resolve the underrepresentation and 
misrepresentation of minorities, the problem is still prevalent in 
society.131 This article acknowledges that the FCC supports 
ownership, equal employment, and ascertainment policies, but the 
data from my study proves the FCC’s methods are not working. 
E.   Legislation is Necessary to Improve the Representation of 
Minorities in Films 
My research study recognizes that Hollywood has improved 
because the film industry originally had no minorities as owners of 
TV stations and radio stations, no minorities cast for on-screen roles, 
and no minorities in leadership positions behind the camera.132 
However, the increase is not significant enough. As a nation that 
promotes itself as a melting pot of cultures, we do not want to be 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Id. at 43–44. 
 128. Leonard M. Baynes, WHITE OUT: The Absence and Stereotyping of People of Color by the 
Broadcast Networks in Prime Time Entertainment Programming, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 293, 311 (2003). 
 129. Chong, supra note 3, at 44. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 33. 
 132. Id. at 44. 
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subpar in our diversity standards. This article argues that the 
entertainment industry’s current failure to reach parity is likely due to 
three reasons: (1) existing regulations are not aggressively enforced 
and create loopholes for employers, (2) government policies focus on 
regulating the wrong area of Hollywood, and (3) courts believe that 
First Amendment rights are more significant than promoting diversity 
or equal employment. 
1.   Existing Regulations Are Not Aggressively Enforced and 
Create Loopholes 
Hollywood often flies under the Title VII and § 1981 radar 
because whether directors, casting directors, screenwriters, actors, 
and actresses are employees or independent contractors is a common 
topic of debate.133 In the movie category, it is more likely that the 
film industry employs people as independent contractors because the 
creation of the film is a temporary project.134 However, in the 
television category, many series are ongoing, and the relationship 
with the cast and crew is not a one-time interaction.135 The gray area 
in determining whether someone is an employee or independent 
contractor makes it difficult for courts to determine if minorities 
attempting to break into film are protected under existing labor 
laws.136 
Moreover, Title VII and § 1981 address employment 
discrimination generally and do not target one industry.137 As a 
result, many injured parties are unaware that the entertainment 
industry’s practices are illegal because no specific law refers to 
Hollywood’s practices. In addition, most individuals searching for 
stable careers in Hollywood are unlikely to enforce their rights; 
struggling actors and actresses who fall victim to casting-call 
                                                                                                                 
 133. Kurtis Anton, The Debate of Independent Contractor or Employee in Filmmaking, LINKEDIN 
(Oct. 23, 2016), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/debate-independent-contractor-employee-filmmaking-
kurtis-anton [https://perma.cc/4YR6-3VEJ]. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Chong, supra note 3, at 54. 
 136. See id. 
 137. See generally Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; 42 U.S.C. § 1981 
(2018). 
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discrimination normally do not have the financial means to fight the 
large film companies.138 Hollywood is also an insular network, and 
creating enemies through lawsuits almost guarantees that the actor or 
actress will be blacklisted. The ambiguity and lack of litigation have 
allowed our governing bodies to avoid having to harshly enforce the 
laws against film leaders who violate discrimination laws, leaving 
this area of law underdeveloped.139 
2.   Congressional Action Should Focus on Creation of Films 
and Not Only Ownership 
A true change in our media requires Congress to diversify the 
artists in the field, not only the owners of broadcast stations and cable 
networks. The FCC focuses on regulating the ownership of stations 
through licensees, but this only addresses the distribution of films.140 
The FCC does not regulate the parties that actually create the film 
content submitted to the stations.141 If the FCC manages to increase 
minority ownership of stations but the selection of films available to 
the distributed stations remains limited, then it will be difficult to 
provide more diverse films to the public. 
Congress must focus its regulatory energy on the individuals 
creating and starring in the films to provide owners with more 
minority-created films and nonstereotypical portrayals of minorities 
on screen. This article proposes legislation that will help Congress 
better regulate the artists in the film industry without violating the 
First Amendment. 
                                                                                                                 
 138. See Marie Tae McDermott, ‘I Was Blacklisted from Employment’: Speaking Up in the 
Workplace, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/11/business/i-was-
blacklisted-from-employment-speaking-up-in-the-workplace.html [https://perma.cc/7ARY-BNZV]. 
 139. Henna Choi, white Men Still Dominate Reality Television: Discriminatory Casting and the Need 
for Regulation, 37 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. J. 163, 169 (2015). 
 140. See What We Do, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/N7UV-
YE7M] (last visited Nov. 1, 2018). 
 141. See id. 
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3.   Freedom of Speech Often Trumps Diversity 
In 2012, the Middle District of Tennessee, in Claybrooks v. ABC, 
held that casting decisions are protected by the First Amendment.142 
The Claybrooks decision is a prime example of a court ruling that the 
First Amendment is more important than diversity without 
Congressional support or guidance for the decision.143 In fact, as 
discussed above, Congress has indicated that diversity is equally 
important through its regulation of the broadcast, cable, and film 
industries.144 Congress explicitly recognized that “the effects of past 
inequities stemming from racial and ethnic discrimination have 
resulted in a severe underrepresentation of minorities in the media of 
mass communications” and justified the minority ownership policies 
of the FCC as “primarily to promote programming diversity.”145 
Congress and the Supreme Court have agreed that “diversity is an 
important governmental objective” that justifies preferential 
treatment on the basis of race.146 Nevertheless, the court in 
Claybrooks determined that diversity was not a priority.147 To 
remedy the Claybrooks decision and ensure other courts do not make 
similar mistakes, Congress should actively make its viewpoint 
understood by the judiciary through legislative action. 
Some scholars believe that the market will naturally correct the 
lack of diversity in Hollywood148 but, as shown in the data from my 
research study, it has taken minorities over 100 years to simply gain a 
foothold in the American film industry.149 Without help from our 
country’s leaders, reaching parity is not in the near future. Legislative 
action or harsher enforcement of employment advertisement policies 
is necessary to help us reach an acceptable standard of minority 
representation within our lifetimes. 
                                                                                                                 
 142. Claybrooks v. Am. Broad. Co., 898 F. Supp. 2d 986, 999 (M.D. Tenn. 2012). 
 143. See Chong, supra note 3, at 42–53. 
 144. See discussion supra Part I.D. 
 145. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 566 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Chong, supra note 3, at 52. 
 148. Id. at 52–53. 
 149. Id. at 52. 
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II.   Content-Based Regulation: Casting Calls Must Be Race Neutral 
First, this section argues that race-specific casting calls are illegal 
speech under Title VII and should receive no protection under the 
First Amendment.150 Second, this section explains pertinent freedom 
of speech doctrines and presents a regulation that will pass the First 
Amendment’s strict scrutiny standard even though it requires casting 
calls to be race neutral.151 
A.   Under Title VII 2000e-3(b), Race Specific Casting Calls Are 
Illegal, Unprotected Speech 
Title VII explicitly states that “[i]t shall be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer . . . [or] employment 
agency . . . to print . . . or cause to be printed or published any notice 
or advertisement relating to employment . . . indicating any 
preference . . . based on race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.”152 Although a casting call is a published notice related to 
employment that indicates a preference based on race, sex, color, or 
national origin, casting calls have not been ruled as an illegal hiring 
practice.153 On the contrary, casting calls have been and still are a 
common practice in the movie and television industry for finding 
actors and actresses.154 
Leaders in Hollywood have openly admitted that casting is not 
always about talent but rather about finding the person who best fits 
the casting call.155 A casting call is a synopsis that includes the script 
and character descriptions that often state the character’s desired 
race.156 Some casting calls do not specify a race, but others 
                                                                                                                 
 150. See infra Part II.A. 
 151. See infra Part II.B. 
 152. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (2018). 
 153. See Russell K. Robinson, Casting and Caste-ing: Reconciling Artistic Freedom and 
Antidiscrimination Norms, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Baynes, supra note 127, at 311; see also Debbie Sikkema, What Is a Breakdown? (Showbiz Term 
of the Day), YOUR YOUNG ACTOR (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.youryoungactor.com/2009/12/07/what-is-
a-breakdown-showbiz-term-of-the-day/#sthash.WdrKnqjk.dpuf [https://perma.cc/VMZ7-Z9H8] 
(defining breakdown as a synopsis of the project that includes the script with character descriptions). 
 156. See Baynes, supra note 127, at 311. 
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specifically ask for a white actor or actress.157 Nine out of ten times, 
if the race is unspecified, the role goes to a white person because 
casting directors eliminate people of color by default.158 Although 
courts have acknowledged that television broadcasters can be subject 
to labor-relations law, such as discriminatory employment 
practices,159 studios and other power players in the film industry have 
not been reprimanded for violating these laws and continue to use 
discriminatory job postings.160 
Hollywood argues that it is exempt from the Court’s strong policy 
against discriminatory advertising because the First Amendment 
protects its actions.161 However, this assertion has limited merit 
because courts have prohibited discriminatory advertising in other 
industries despite defendants’ First Amendment concerns, such as the 
housing industry and printed press.162 For example, in Ragin v. New 
York Times Co., the Second Circuit held that the New York Times 
Company (the Times) violated the Fair Housing Act of 1968 because 
it published an advertisement for the sale and rental of a dwelling that 
indicated a preference based on race.163 
In Ragin, during the twenty-year period after the Fair Housing Act 
was passed, the Times featured thousands of human models, but 
virtually none were black.164 The few blacks depicted were 
maintenance employees and doormen, but blacks were never 
portrayed as potential homeowners.165 The court confirmed that 
liability for racial discrimination could be viewed in the aggregate 
and deemed the Times’s twenty-year pattern of only depicting white 
homeowners a powerful engine for housing segregation.166 The court 
also stated that allowing the Times to discriminate based on effects 
                                                                                                                 
 157. But see id. 
 158. See id. 
 159. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 397 (1973). 
 160. Claybrooks v. Am. Broad. Co., 898 F. Supp. 2d 986, 993 (M.D. Tenn. 2012). 
 161. See Chong, supra note 3, at 52–53, 56. 
 162. Robinson, supra note 152, at 43–44. 
 163. Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 998. (2d Cir. 1991). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 1002. 
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would undermine civil rights laws such as Title VII, which prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of race in employment.167 
The Times tried to argue that allowing racially conscious decisions 
would make racial quotas in advertising a reality, but the court 
rejected the argument.168 The court stated that, unlike college 
admissions, where the quota argument was entertained, “advertising 
is a make-up-your-own world in which one builds an image from 
scratch, selecting those portrayals that will attract targeted consumers 
and discarding those that will put them off.”169 Academia deals with 
real-life, competitive situations where individual skills and academic 
criteria should govern decisions.170 Although racial decisions are 
inevitable in advertising, the law still requests advertisers to make 
choices that will not create a suggestion of racial preference.171 
In today’s society, Hollywood’s race-specific casting procedures 
resemble the same “make-up-your-own-world” practice discussed in 
Ragin and have contributed to nondiverse casts and segregated 
programming.172 Similar to the Times, Hollywood has made First 
Amendment arguments to protect the industry’s practice of 
employment advertising for only white actors or actresses.173 Unlike 
the Times, however, Hollywood has been allowed to post 
discriminatory, race-specific casting calls for more than twenty years 
because courts and legislators have entertained Hollywood’s claims 
that prohibiting certain casting decisions will negatively impact the 
content of films.174 To remedy this problem, courts and Congress 
must realize that requiring race-neutral casting calls will not impact 
the artist’s final casting decisions; requiring race-neutral casting calls 
                                                                                                                 
 167. Id. at 1004. 
 168. Id. at 1000–01. 
 169. Ragin, 923 F.2d at 1001. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 1000. The Times also argued that the government should not be able to regulate advertising 
decisions based on race because racially discriminatory advertising would lead to a multitude of 
plaintiffs suing for damage awards that would impair the press’s role in society. Id. at 1004. The court 
rejected this argument and reasoned that no device exists to determine if this possibility is credible or 
baseless and that the speculative nature of the assertion was not a reason to immunize publishers from 
discriminatory behavior. Id. at 1005. 
 172. Id. at 1001. 
 173. Chong, supra note 3, at 52, 57. 
 174. Id. at 56. 
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merely creates opportunities for more people of color to appear in 
front of the casting director, screenwriter, and director to prove that 
they are qualified for the role. 
Another example is Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh 
Commission on Human Relations, where the Court held that the 
newspaper’s advertisements in sex-specific columns were 
unprotected commercial speech because they expressed no social 
policy or expression of ideas.175 The newspaper had allowed 
employers to place help-wanted advertisements in sex-designated 
columns, such as “Male Help Wanted” or “Jobs—Female Interest,” 
even though the jobs advertised obviously had no sex-based bona 
fide occupational qualifications.176 The Court ordered Pittsburgh 
Press to revamp its employment advertisement section because the 
current advertisements did not discuss why certain positions ought to 
be filled by members of one sex over another.177 The newspaper’s 
advertisements were considered a “classic example[] of [illegal] 
commercial speech” because they advocated for discrimination in 
employment; the editorial judgment of whether to accept an 
advertisement and place it in the correct column did not strip the 
commercial advertising of its commercial character.178 
The Supreme Court rejected Pittsburgh Press’s First Amendment 
argument and ordered the newspaper to use a classification system 
with no reference to sex.179 Although the ordinance did impact the 
newspaper’s editing of the help-wanted section and could be viewed 
as impacting the newspaper’s content, the Court analogized the sex-
based discrimination advertisements to defamatory speech.180 The 
Court held that the First Amendment did not protect the newspaper’s 
discriminatory editorial decisions because the First Amendment 
would not shield a newspaper from punishment for libel when actual 
malice and falsity existed.181 The Court further analogized Pittsburgh 
                                                                                                                 
 175. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973). 
 176. Id. at 378–79. 
 177. Id. at 385. 
 178. Id. at 385, 388. 
 179. Id. at 388. 
 180. Id. at 386. 
 181. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
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Press’s actions to ads proposing the sale of narcotics or soliciting 
prostitutes, which could also be constitutionally forbidden.182 Based 
on the reasoning above, the Court held that the Constitution 
prohibited Pittsburgh Press’s commercial practice of allowing 
employers to post employment ads with a sex preference.183 
Hollywood’s casting calls are identical to the illegal job postings 
in Pittsburgh Press184 and should not be treated any differently. Title 
VII states that employment advertisements specifying a race are 
illegal.185 If Pittsburgh Press was not allowed to post jobs that 
specified a preference based on gender—a quasi-suspect class—then 
Hollywood should not be allowed to advertise for actors and 
actresses of a specific race, a suspect class. Pittsburgh Press also 
confirmed that the First Amendment is not a complete shield for any 
discriminatory action involving creative discretion.186 The Court 
regulated the content of the Pittsburgh newspaper, which indirectly 
affected who would advertise in the newspaper.187 Similarly, courts 
should be able to regulate the content of casting calls, even if 
regulation indirectly impacts who will audition and be cast in the 
film. Free speech proponents who believe casting regulation would 
impact a film’s tone and message are incorrect because whether a 
doctor is black, Asian, white, or Native American does not impact a 
storyline focused on a doctor saving people, two people falling in 
love, or everyday life scenarios. 
In conclusion, in both Ragin and Pittsburgh Press, the courts 
required the newspapers to monitor the ads that they received and 
avoid indicating a racial or gender preference.188 The courts held that 
requiring the advertisements to be race and gender neutral did not 
impose an unconstitutional burden on the press and would not disrupt 
                                                                                                                 
 182. Id. at 388. 
 183. Id. 
 184. “Just Mercy” Starring Jamie Foxx—Kids & Teens, AUDITIONSFINDER (Oct. 24, 2018), 
https://www.auditionsfinder.com/new/just-mercy-starring-jamie-foxx-kids-teens/ 
[https://perma.cc/83ML-AVXT]. 
 185. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (2018). 
 186. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 386 (1973). 
 187. Id. at 389. 
 188. Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1003 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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the press’s traditional role of editorial control and free expression of 
views.189 Title VII is identical.190 There is no specific reason why an 
Asian person cannot be cast as a superhero or an FBI agent over a 
white person. The U.S. has an established precedent of ruling against 
discriminatory advertising,191 and regulators should recognize that 
the current practice of casting calls in Hollywood is illegal under 
Title VII. 
However, this article recognizes that advocating for enforcement 
of a law that has existed for more than fifty years and has been 
consistently neglected is unlikely to fix Hollywood’s illegal casting 
process in a timely manner. Thus, to speed up the process, this article 
advocates for creating a specific law related to casting calls to 
provide a concrete cause of action for artists who suffer 
discrimination. A new law would send a strong message of 
deterrence to entertainment industry leaders who have continued 
discriminatory hiring practices. 
This article proposes the following language: 
To promote equal employment opportunities for minorities, 
all casting calls must be race neutral unless the race of the 
character is essential (1) to the storyline, (2) to preserve 
historical or regional accuracy, or (3) to maintain the 
network’s identity-themed programming. If none of the 
three exceptions apply, then the race of the actor or actress 
is likely insignificant and does not need to be specified on 
the employment advertisement. 
To stop the practice of race-specific casting calls, Congress must 
specify that race-specific casting calls are illegal. If our government 
fears that including casting calls as an employment advertisement 
could violate the First Amendment, there is no merit in that fear. The 
First Amendment provides no protection for illegal commercial 
                                                                                                                 
 189. Id. 
 190. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b). 
 191. Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 388; Ragin, 923 F.2d at 1003. 
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speech or activity that shows a preference on the basis of race, such 
as deceptive advertising or commercial speech related to any illegal 
activity.192 As shown in Ragin and Pittsburgh Press, any type of 
racial discrimination in advertising is likely considered an illegal 
activity.193 Thus, the freedom of speech will not protect employers 
who only want a white actor, actress, director, casting director, or 
screenwriter. The next section discusses this issue in detail.194 
B.   Requiring Race-Neutral Casting Calls Does Not Violate the 
First Amendment 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”195 The Supreme Court 
acknowledged that the First Amendment protects “entertainment, as 
well as political and ideological speech” and that a “‘particularized 
message’ is not required for speech to be constitutionally 
protected.”196 Entertainment work includes scripts, storyboards, 
storylines, character development, dialogue, sounds, graphic design, 
concept art, sounds, music, narratives, video games, motion pictures, 
editorial opinions of newspapers, and broadcasts on controversial 
issues of public importance.197 However, the reality is that “[t]otally 
unlimited free will . . . is not allowed in our or any other society.”198 
“The First Amendment’s guaranty is not absolute”199 and has varying 
standards of review depending on the speech involved.200 
                                                                                                                 
 192. Ragin, 923 F.2d at 999. 
 193. See, e.g., id. at 1003. 
 194. See infra Part II.B. 
 195. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 584 (S.D. Fla. 1990). 
 196. Interactive Dig. Software Ass’n v. St. Louis Cty., 329 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 2003); see also 
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981). 
 197. Interactive Dig. Software Ass’n, 329 F.3d at 957; see also FCC v. League of Women Voters of 
Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 381–82 (1984); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 563 (1977); 
Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 76–77 (1976). 
 198. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 586. 
 199. Id. at 584; see also Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 318 (1977) (“Although offensive or 
misleading statements in a political oration cannot be censored, offensive language in a courtroom or 
misleading representations in a securities prospectus may surely be regulated. Nuisances such as sound 
trucks and erotic displays in a residential area may be abated under appropriately flexible civil standards 
even though the First Amendment provides a shield against criminal prosecution.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 200. Interactive Dig. Software Ass’n, 329 F.3d at 958. 
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To determine if a regulation requiring casting calls to be race-
neutral would violate the First Amendment, the courts must 
categorize the type of speech limited by the regulation and then apply 
the appropriate scrutiny.201 If the regulation requires parties to 
examine the content of the message to determine if the views 
expressed violate it, then the regulation is content based,202 which 
means which means that the regulation is presumptively invalid203 
and must pass strict scrutiny.204 The government bears the burden of 
demonstrating that the regulation is necessary to serve a compelling 
state interest and that it is narrowly tailored to achieve that end by 
putting the least possible burden on expression.205 
Hollywood would likely argue that requiring race-neutral casting 
calls is a content-based regulation because the regulation impacts the 
text of the casting breakdown, which can indirectly impact the 
message of some films. Many directors claim that the race of an actor 
or actress can play a vital role in the film’s overall composition,206 
but this argument has limited merit. Storylines can be developed 
without a racial component. For example, whether two teenagers 
attending high school are black, white, or Asian does not matter if 
there is no interracial component to the message conveyed by the 
film. Thus, although casting calls likely deserve some protection, as 
discussed in Section II-A, Hollywood’s admission that it 
purposefully posts racially discriminatory employment 
advertisements justifies reviewing the race-neutral regulation under a 
lower standard because the discriminatory ads are illegal speech. 
This section makes two arguments. First, if race-specific casting 
calls are protected under the First Amendment, courts should apply a 
lower standard of review, similar to obscene speech and commercial 
speech.207 Second, if courts determine that race-specific casting calls 
                                                                                                                 
 201. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 788 (1988). 
 202. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. at 383. 
 203. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 782 (1996). 
 204. Interactive Dig. Software Ass’n, 329 F.3d at 958. 
 205. Id.; U.S. Sound & Serv., Inc. v. Township of Brick, 126 F.3d 555, 558 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 206. Robinson, supra note 152, at 11–12. 
 207. Id. at 44. 
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deserve the highest protection afforded by the U.S. Constitution, then 
requiring race-neutral casting calls passes strict scrutiny.208 
1.   Similar to Obscene and Commercial Speech, Discriminatory 
Casting Calls that Perpetuate Discriminatory Messages in 
Films Deserve Less First Amendment Protection 
Films with a nondiverse cast or minorities cast in stereotypical 
roles deserve limited protection because they can create implicit 
biases in children that negatively impact the children’s development. 
This policy of protecting children can be easily analogized to 
America’s current regulation of (a) obscene speech and (b) 
commercial speech. 
a)   Obscene Speech: No First Amendment Protection 
The First Amendment will not tolerate the total suppression of 
erotic materials that have some arguably artistic value.209 However, 
when the speech is so obscene that it is of such slight social value 
that it is outweighed by the compelling interest of society, then the 
obscene speech has no protection under the First Amendment210 and 
can be regulated by the federal and state governments by virtue of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s police power.211 The government’s interest 
in the “well-being of its youth” and in supporting parents’ claims to 
authority in their own households justifies the regulation of obscene 
speech.212 If a statute regulates unprotected obscenity, mere 
rationality is sufficient to satisfy due process.213 
Courts reason that the lower standard of review is appropriate 
because obscene materials can distort or reduce the quality of 
“human existence.”214 There is a universal belief that good art can lift 
the spirit, improve the mind, enrich the human personality, and 
                                                                                                                 
 208. Id. at 41–42. 
 209. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976). 
 210. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 584 (S.D. Fla. 1990). 
 211. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54 (1973). 
 212. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978). 
 213. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 586. 
 214. Paris, 413 U.S. at 63. 
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develop character.215 Thus, state legislatures can assume that obscene 
art can similarly lead to corruptive or antisocial behavior and 
encourage extreme, promiscuous behavior among children, which 
would result in the children receiving disapproval from most people 
in society.216 Legislatures have concluded that a “sensitive, key 
relationship of human existence” that is “central to family life, 
community welfare, and the development of human personality, can 
be . . . distorted by [the] crass commercial exploitation of sex.”217 
The government’s reasoning for analyzing obscene speech under a 
lower standard of rational basis can easily be applied to 
discriminatory art that portrays minorities in stereotypical roles or 
race-specific casting calls that indicate people of color are not a 
desirable commodity in Hollywood. For example, in Skyywalker 
Records, Inc. v. Navarro, the Southern District of Florida held that 
material lacking serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, 
is not something that the law calls art; on the contrary, works that 
include discrimination and obscenity are works that the law calls a 
crime.218 Skyywalker looked at an artist’s recording that included 
riffs, rhythm, and explicit sexual lyrics.219 After the court examined 
the piece as a whole to determine its social value it ruled that once 
the riffs were removed, the remaining rhythm and lyrics had no 
redeeming social value.220 The court confirmed that regulation of 
obscene speech is allowed because both the federal and state 
governments “banned prostitution, incest, rape, and other sexually 
related conduct.”221 
If legislatures applied the same logic used in Skyywalker, 
discriminatory art and casting calls would have no “redeeming social 
value” after common ideas, such as the basic storyline or character 
arch, are removed and the racial classification would be all that 
                                                                                                                 
 215. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 585. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Paris, 413 U.S. at 63. 
 218. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 596. 
 219. Id. at 582–83. 
 220. Id. at 596. 
 221. Id. at 584. 
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remains.222 The remaining racially discriminatory casting call could 
be regulated because the federal government has made race-specific 
employment advertisements and discriminatory hiring practices 
illegal under Title VII.223 Governments have regulated obscene 
speech because it is linked to illegal conduct, such as sexual assault 
and rape;224 governments should regulate discriminatory speech 
because it is linked to discriminatory conduct, such as employment 
discrimination and racism.225 
Courts have even ruled that “the use of the F-word [can be] 
indecent” because it is “one of the most vulgar, graphic and explicit 
descriptions of sexual activity in the English language,” and exposure 
to it “could [enlarge] a child’s vocabulary in an instant.”226 Courts 
allow the FCC to regulate broadcasts of the F-word if children might 
be in the audience, even if used as a fleeting expletive and not in a 
sustained or repeated manner.227 Similarly, brief exposure to a 
stereotypical portrayal of a minority or no exposure to minorities on 
television can impact a child’s psyche and cause the child to develop 
a skewed view of minorities that can lead to intolerance in the form 
of racism, fear, or implicit biases. 
Another example is Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton.228 In Paris, the 
Court permitted the regulation of obscene material in local commerce 
to promote the public’s interests in maintaining a high quality of life, 
a comfortable community environment, and the public’s safety.229 
The Supreme Court upheld a law that allowed states to regulate the 
commerce of pornographic films, even in public places of 
accommodation like “‘adult’ theatres” that excluded minors230 and 
displayed warning signs, such as, “You must be 21 and able to prove 
                                                                                                                 
 222. Id. at 596. 
 223. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (2018). 
 224. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 586. 
 225. Choi, supra note 138, at 165. 
 226. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 248 (2012); Complaints Against Various 
Broad. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the “Golden Globe Awards” Program, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975, 
4976–79 (2004). 
 227. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 732 (1978). 
 228. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 49 (1973). 
 229. Id. at 57–58. 
 230. Id. at 69. 
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it. If viewing the nude body offends you, Please Do Not Enter.”231 
The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that pornographic films 
had constitutional immunity under the First Amendment232 because 
the state’s interest to regulate exposure of obscene materials to 
juveniles and nonconsenting adults was of high importance.233 The 
Court was not swayed by the argument that the government must 
protect a consenting person’s privacy interest to view obscene films 
in places of public accommodation.234 
Similar to Paris, our state and federal legislatures should be able to 
regulate discriminatory speech because the public exhibition or 
commerce of offensive material can injure the community as a whole 
and jeopardize the state’s right to maintain a decent society.235 As 
seen during the recent election of President Donald Trump, the 
careless use of offensive speech can cause unrest and tension in the 
community.236 To eliminate the promotion of hate and intolerance, 
our government must look at the root of the problem, which likely 
lies in the media and films shown to society—especially to children 
and teenagers. 
Unfortunately, the ideas that stereotypical portrayals are offensive 
speech or that race-specific casting calls discourage minorities to 
                                                                                                                 
 231. Id. at 52. 
 232. Id. at 57. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Paris, 413 U.S. at 68. Another example appeared in Denver Area Educational 
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audition are less likely to be accepted by the majority. In 2014, 
minorities were 38% of the population and held limited positions of 
power in our government.237 This means that the majority of our 
nation’s leaders and the remaining 62% of the U.S. population 
includes individuals who are less likely to be offended by Asians 
portrayed as nerds with 
“slanty” eyes, blacks and Hispanics in gangs, or Native Americans 
with feathers on their heads.238 To the majority, stereotypical 
portrayals or discriminatory hiring might even be considered normal 
or a common strategic business practice. As a result, they are more 
likely to direct their energy towards initiatives that relate to their 
personal experiences. 
Where are the Asians in Hollywood? discussed why the First 
Amendment was viewed as more important than the Fourteenth 
Amendment; the majority can more easily relate to the ideas of free 
speech than to ideas of diversity.239 When comparing the majority’s 
relatability to the impact of obscene art versus discrimination, the 
results are the same; it is likely that the majority can relate to the idea 
of protecting their children from obscenity more easily than the idea 
of protecting minorities from discrimination.240 This relatability-to-
issues phenomenon is why U.S. governments have regulated obscene 
speech but not Hollywood’s discriminatory casting or stereotypical 
portrayals of minorities.241 Almost everyone can identify with 
protecting children because the color of a person’s skin does not 
impact a person’s parental desires to protect their child.242 
                                                                                                                 
 237. Minority Representation, FAIR VOTE, https://www.fairvote.org/minority_representation 
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However, the white majority, which controls our government,243 is 
less able to understand how discriminatory employment 
advertisements and films can create negative environments for 
minorities and limit the appearance of minorities on screen, which 
creates antisocial behavior among our youth in the form of explicit 
and implicit biases against minorities.244 Courts allow the 
government to regulate expressive conduct, such as nude dancing.245 
Thus, expressive films should not be treated differently, especially if 
further regulation can eliminate discriminatory speech and protect 
society’s morality.246 Society must push the government to recognize 
that Hollywood’s race-specific casting calls and stereotypical films 
are a form of discriminatory expression that should be discouraged. 
b)   Commercial Speech: Rational Basis Review 
Similar to obscene speech, the Constitution accords less protection 
to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed 
expression, such as the news.247 To determine if speech is 
commercial, the courts must look to more than just the aspects of 
sales, solicitation, payment, financial motivation of the advertiser, 
and the relationship of speech to the activity;248 the courts must 
balance the value of the speech against the public interest served by 
the regulation.249 For example, if an advertisement focuses only on an 
exchange of services, then it is likely considered pure commercial 
advertising that is unprotected,250 such as paid commercial 
advertisements that are driven by the solicitor’s desire for gainful 
sales or occupation.251 
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However, if an advertisement mainly focuses on the exchanging of 
ideas, then its mere advertisement characteristic will not be 
determinative of whether it deserves First Amendment protection.252 
Courts have clarified that legal commercial speech, such as charitable 
solicitations,253 is afforded some degree of protection—even paid 
advertisements—because some advertisements might convey 
information of potential interest and value to a diverse audience.254 
The First Amendment provides no protection for illegal 
commercial speech, such as deceptive advertising, activities showing 
a racial preference, and commercial speech related to any illegal 
activity.255 However, legal commercial speech is subject to 
reasonable regulation that serves a legitimate public interest.256 
Race-specific casting calls are likely illegal speech under Title VII 
because the main purpose of a casting call is to obtain potential talent 
for the film and not to communicate any specific ideals or 
messages.257 Artists often argue that casting calls can impact the 
underlying messages of the film itself because casting decisions can 
change the feeling and tone of the film.258 In Riley v. National 
Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., the Court entertained 
an intertwined argument when it held that a charitable solicitation 
was not pure commercial speech because the solicitation was 
characteristically intertwined with informative and persuasive 
speech; without the solicitation, the flow of information and 
advocacy from the charity would likely have ceased.259 
The Court held that charitable solicitation deserved First 
Amendment protection because it would be artificial and impractical 
to parcel out the speech by “applying one test to one phrase and 
                                                                                                                 
 252. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 831. 
 253. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 788 (1988). 
 254. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822. 
 255. Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1003 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 256. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 826. 
 257. Robinson, supra note 152, at 4. 
 258. Noam Kroll, 90% of Directing Is Casting! Here’s Why You Need to Prioritize Your Talent, 
NOAM KROLL FILMMAKING RESOURCE & COMMUNITY (June 26, 2014), http://noamkroll.com/90-of-
directing-is-casting-heres-why-you-need-to-prioritize-your-talent/ [https://perma.cc/Q8NW-H6F4].  
 259. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988). 
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another test to another phrase.”260 Even if the Court determined that 
casting calls deserve protection because, similar to charitable 
solutions, the ads are intertwined with the film’s message, this article 
argues that Congress can still impose regulations using a rational-
basis review because films are commercial speech rather than mere 
expressive speech. 
A large part of the entertainment industry is driven by the need to 
make money.261 Hollywood defines the success of a film by the 
amount of sales during its opening weekend or the number of 
viewers.262 Although there are several films created as pure 
expressions without regard to making a profit, such as independent 
films, Hollywood does not define success by the strength of its 
message.263 As a result, Hollywood’s films and casting calls are more 
likely commercial speech and should be reviewed with a lower level 
of scrutiny. 
In Associated Press v. NLRB, the Court recognized that the 
commercial aspects of newsgathering and publishing were different 
from the editorial function and upheld that the newsgathering 
organization must follow the National Labor Relations Act despite its 
First Amendment objections.264 The Court also subjected the 
newspaper to antitrust laws265 and provisions of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act.266 This suggests that regulation of organizations that 
have aspects of commercial speech and artistic speech are not 
necessarily subject to a heightened scrutiny and that casting calls that 
                                                                                                                 
 260. Id. 
 261. Adam Davidson, How Does the Film Industry Actually Make Money?, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 
2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/magazine/how-does-the-film-industry-actually-make-
money.html [https://perma.cc/73ZG-YX8K]. 
 262. Colin Moreshead, Hollywood Is Now Making Films for Foreign Markets, and Their Taste in 
Movies Is Awful, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 18, 2012, 10:08 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/hollywood-is-making-films-for-foreign-markets-2012-9 
[https://perma.cc/6GSC-YFPM]. 
 263. Sean Fennessey, The End of Independent Film as We Know It, RINGER (Apr. 10, 2017, 11:49 
AM), https://www.theringer.com/2017/4/10/16044256/netflix-amazon-studios-independent-film-
sundance-5def390a69ef [https://perma.cc/XMF2-6ZHN]. 
 264. Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 128–29 (1937). 
 265. Ind. Farmer’s Guide Publ’g Co. v. Prairie Farmer Publ’g Co., 293 U.S. 268, 271 (1934). 
 266. Smith v. Evening News Ass’n, 371 U.S. 195, 196 (1962). 
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possess artistic and commercial value should not automatically 
receive heightened scrutiny. 
2.   If Courts Apply Strict Scrutiny, the Regulation is Narrowly 
Tailored to Serve Multiple Compelling Government Interests 
The purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public 
authority from assuming guardianship of the public mind through 
regulating press, speech, and religion.267 The First Amendment 
mandates that the government “not interfere [with expressions of 
First Amendment freedoms] on the ground that [it] view[s] a 
particular expression as unwise or irrational.”268 Even with the purest 
motives, the government cannot substitute its judgment as to how 
best to speak for the public,269 especially in areas where the 
Constitution leaves matters of taste and style largely to the 
individual.270 
However, the Court has stated that the government’s interest “in 
protecting societal order and morality” is a substantial interest.271 
Courts have reasoned that society’s moral views are enough to justify 
a statute that reaches a significant amount of protective expressive 
activity.272 Past prohibitions that have been upheld in American 
society on the basis of protecting order and morality include 
“sadomasochism, cockfighting, bestiality, suicide, drug use, 
prostitution, and sodomy.”273 Similarly, discriminatory casting calls 
are expressive activities that violate society’s morality because the 
race-specific casting calls promote unequal employment 
opportunities.274 But if the courts determine that commercial, race-
                                                                                                                 
 267. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 791 (1988). 
 268. Id. at 790–91 (quoting Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 
124 (1981)); see also Democratic Party of U.S., 450 U.S. at 124 (criticizing the state’s paternalistic 
interest in protecting the political process by restricting speech by corporations); Linmark Assocs., Inc. 
v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96–97 (1977) (criticizing, in the commercial speech context, the state’s 
paternalistic interest in maintaining the quality of neighborhoods by restricting speech to residents). 
 269. Riley, 487 U.S. at 791. 
 270. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 593–94 (1991). 
 271. Id. at 560. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. at 575. 
 274. See id. at 569. 
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specific casting calls are fully protected because they can impact the 
underlying message of a film, this section argues that requiring race-
neutral casting calls still survives strict scrutiny because the proposed 
statute focuses on casting advertisements, which are a small portion 
of the film, and not casting decisions. Moreover, the statute requiring 
race-neutral casting calls furthers the compelling government 
interests of protecting (a) a minority’s right to earn a living and (b) 
America’s children from discriminatory, stereotypical portrayals of 
minorities.275 
a)   Right to Earn a Living 
A minority’s right to practice his or her profession as an artist in 
Hollywood is a fundamental right,276 and race-neutral casting calls 
are necessary to protect a minority’s right to earn a living. The 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.277 
Courts have explained that “[l]iberty means more than freedom 
from servitude, and the constitutional guarantee is an assurance that 
the citizen shall be protected in the right to use his powers of mind 
and body in any lawful calling.”278 If a man is deprived of the right to 
labor, his liberty is restricted because his capacity to earn wages and 
acquire property is lessened.279 Thus, the right to earn a living is an 
                                                                                                                 
 275. See Robinson, supra note 152, at 1. To promote equal employment opportunities for minorities, 
all casting calls must be race neutral unless the race of the character is essential (1) to the storyline, (b) 
to preserve historical or regional accuracy, or (3) to maintain the network’s identity-themed 
programming. If the three exceptions do not apply, then the race of the actor or actress is likely 
insignificant and does not need to be specified on the employment advertisement. Id. 
 276. See Lone Star Sec. & Video, Inc. v. Bureau of Sec. and Investigative Servs., 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
173, 178 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (“The right to practice one’s profession is a fundamental vested 
right . . . .”). 
 277. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 278. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 322 (1976). 
 279. Id. 
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important interest and requires the courts to look at reasons for 
depriving people of their jobs carefully.280 
The Supreme Court has held that “the right of the individual . . . to 
engage in any of the common occupations of life” is the “very 
essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the 
purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure.”281 Justice 
Douglas explicitly stated: 
Employment is one of the greatest, if not the greatest, benefits that 
governments offer in modern-day life. When something as valuable 
as the opportunity to work is at stake, the government may not 
reward some citizens and not others without demonstrating that its 
actions are fair and equitable. And it is procedural due process that is 
our fundamental guarantee of fairness, our protection against 
arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable government action.282 
Unfortunately, courts have also admitted that private employers 
are free to act capriciously and unreasonably with respect to 
employment practices unless statutory or contractual laws govern 
their actions.283 Thus, even though the Supreme Court established 
that the government may only act fairly and reasonably with respect 
to employment opportunities,284 the Court provides a free pass for 
private employers, which Hollywood currently uses to its advantage. 
Thus, because Congress has the power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the Fourteenth Amendment,285 Congress should require 
race-neutral casting calls to promote a minority’s fundamental right 
to work in Hollywood. 
The major obstacle is that the freedom of expression is also a 
fundamental right,286 which often creates a conflict between equal 
protection and the freedom of speech.287 However, case precedent 
                                                                                                                 
 280. Id. at 323. 
 281. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572, 588 (1972) (quoting Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). 
 282. Id. at 589. 
 283. Id. at 588. 
 284. Id. 
 285. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
 286. KGB, Inc. v. Giannoulas, 164 Cal. Rptr. 571, 581 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). 
 287. See id. 
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and past regulation shows that courts have held that the right to earn 
a living is more compelling than the right to express one’s views.288 
For example, the FCC requires broadcasters to ensure that their 
policies promote equal employment opportunities.289 The FCC’s 
equal employment rules are designed to open the door to minority 
employment and participation in broadcasting in jobs that involve 
more than minimal responsibility.290 
In In Re Application of New Mexico Broadcasting Co., the 
station’s figures showed that employment of Mexican Americans was 
stagnant because in 1971 there were no minority persons employed in 
the categories of officials, managers, and professionals; in 1972 there 
were three; and in 1973 there were five.291 The FCC stated that it is a 
problem when there is little variation in the numbers of full-time, 
Mexican-American employees at the station, especially when the 
total number of full-time employees increased from forty-seven to 
fifty-two between 1973 and 1974 but the total number of Mexican-
American employees remained the same at eight people.292 This 
meant that there was a decrease from 17% to 15.4% in the number of 
Mexican Americans working at the station.293 The FCC confirmed 
that the percentage of minority employees at broadcast stations, 
generally or in specific job categories, did not need to match the 
percentage of minorities in the station’s service area but recognized 
that statistical evidence of a substantial failure to accord equal 
employment opportunities is enough to suggest that a problem exists 
and warrants a hearing.294 
As for employment, the station employed sixty-one persons and 
only seven were Spanish surnamed, which constituted 18.6% of the 
station’s total employees even though the population of Mexican 
                                                                                                                 
 288. Id. 
 289. WGN of Colo., Inc., 31 F.C.C.2d 413, 422 (1971); see also Equal Employment Opportunities, 
47 C.F.R § 73.2080 (2018). 
 290. 47 C.F.R § 73.2080. 
 291. N.M. Broad. Co., Inc., 54 F.C.C.2d 126, 138 (1975). 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. 
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Americans in the service area was 34%.295 The station had no black 
or Native-American employees even though they made up 1% and 
2% of the population, respectively.296 The minority employees were 
also limited to lower positions at the station and not employed in the 
newsroom or management level positions; they were receptionists, 
traffic clerks, and assistant bookkeepers.297 There were no Mexican-
American newscasters in a community where more than one-third 
were Mexican Americans.298 
In Black Broadcasting Coalition of Richmond v. FCC, the D.C. 
Circuit reversed the FCC’s renewal of WTVR’s license without a 
hearing because the station’s actions during its license term showed 
overt discrimination.299 The petitioners presented evidence that: (1) 
WTVR employed only one part-time black employee out of sixty-
two full-time and six part-time employees at its television station and 
no blacks out of the twenty-six employees at its radio stations, (2) 
qualified blacks had been available for employment but were 
rejected, and (3) WTVR engaged in two specific instances of 
discriminatory hiring and firing of blacks.300 The court found that 
WTVR’s history of 1.5% or less black employment during a license 
period in an area where blacks constituted about one-fourth of the 
local workforce suggested discriminatory actions that were outside 
the zone of reasonableness.301 The court also found that passive 
affirmative-action programs, such as simply accepting referrals from 
state employment offers or using equal-opportunity employment 
agencies or lists of community contacts that had little to do with 
outreach, recruitment, and on the job training, were not enough to 
fulfill WTVR’s obligation to recruit minority employees.302 The 
                                                                                                                 
 295. Id. at 135. 
 296. Id. 
 297. N.M. Broad. Co., Inc., 54 F.C.C.2d at 135–36. 
 298. Id. at 136. 
 299. Black Broad. Coal. of Richmond v. FCC, 556 F.2d 59, 64–65 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 300. Id. at 60–61. 
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 302. Id. at 62. 
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court ordered the FCC to hold a full hearing to determine if the 
licensee’s performance met its affirmative action obligations.303 
In both Black Broadcasting and New Mexico Broadcasting, the 
courts allowed the FCC to regulate the employment practices of a 
broadcast company that was responsible for selecting and editing 
programs that are distributed to the public.304 The court and FCC’s 
decisions to make the company’s editorial function secondary to 
promoting nondiscriminatory employment practices supports the 
regulation requiring race-neutral casting calls in Hollywood, 
especially because the employment statistics for minorities in 
Hollywood are as low as in Black Broadcasting and New Mexico 
Broadcasting.305 Although statistics alone do not provide ideal 
evidence of discrimination, if there are specific instances of 
discrimination or conscious policies of exclusion, the FCC must grant 
a hearing to review the renewal of the broadcaster’s license.306 
Congress must similarly review the practices in Hollywood and enact 
laws that will help the industry correct its discriminatory hiring of 
talent. 
The right to earn a living also trumps the First Amendment in 
intellectual property law.307 In Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable 
Toilets, Inc., the Sixth Circuit determined that the right to publicity is 
essential to a person’s right to earn a living and is more important 
than society’s First Amendment rights.308 The court explained that 
the commercial interest of celebrities in their identities can be 
valuable in the promotion of products, which meant that the famous 
had an exclusive legal right during their lives to control and profit 
from the commercial use of their names and personalities.309 
Although the First Amendment protects the freedom to use 
intellectual property, words, and ideas that are in general circulation 
and not protected by valid copyright, patent, or trademark, the right 
                                                                                                                 
 303. Id. at 65. 
 304. See generally id.; N.M. Broad. Co., Inc., 54 F.C.C.2d 126, 135–36 (1975). 
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 307. See Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837, 841 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 308. See id. 
 309. Id. at 835, 838. 
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of publicity exists to promote production of works that benefit the 
public but are a product of an individual’s own talents and energy.310 
Another example is San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. 
Olympic Committee, where the Court held that Congress did not 
prohibit San Francisco Arts and Athletics (SFAA) from conveying its 
message when it passed a law that prohibited SFAA or any other 
entity from using the word “Olympic” in certain contexts.311 The 
petitioners successfully executed their athletic event under the names 
“Gay Games I” and “Gay Games II” without the need for the 
Olympic trademark.312 The Court clarified that Congress had a 
greater interest in promoting the participation of athletes from the 
U.S. in the “great four-year[] sport festival, the Olympic games,” 
educating young people about the “spirit of better understanding 
between each other,” and building “a better and more peaceful 
world” with “international goodwill.” 313 The Court held that the 
incidental restrictions on expressive speech were necessary to further 
this substantial government interest314 because the U.S. Olympic 
Committee’s (USOC) right to use the word “Olympic” was essential 
to supplying the USOC with the means to raise money to support the 
Olympics; it ensured that the USOC received benefits for its efforts 
and was not confused with other organizations.315 Thus, the 
regulation of allowing the USOC to have exclusive control of the 
word “Olympic” was not broader than necessary to protect the 
legitimate government interest and did not violate the First 
Amendment.316 
Similarly, copyright law protects tangible expressions of an idea 
and does not violate the First Amendment because copyright laws do 
not restrain the use of ideas317 but instead protect an entertainer’s 
incentive to produce this type of work by granting valuable, 
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enforceable rights.318 The government believes that the “best way to 
advance public welfare through the talents of authors and investors in 
‘[s]cience and useful [a]rts’” is by protecting the personal gain 
obtained by personal effort.319 In fact, an entire body of intellectual 
property law exists to protect a person’s right to earn a living,320 
which suggests that providing equal employment opportunities is a 
compelling government interest and likely more compelling than a 
person’s right to expression, especially if the expression is plagued 
with discriminatory stereotypes. Thus, casting calls requesting a 
specific race should not be protected by the First Amendment, 
especially when they violate a compelling government interest to a 
minority’s right to work in the entertainment industry. 
b)   Protecting America’s Children from Discriminatory 
Portrayals by Promoting Diversity 
Nondiscriminatory, minority characters are necessary to promote 
diversity and break the cycle of biases because children spend ample 
time watching television, and the images, storylines, and messages 
sent through television programming likely influence their 
personalities and development into adults.321 The Kerner 
Commission warned that “the various elements of the media ‘have 
not communicated to whites a feeling for the difficulties and 
frustrations of being a Negro in the United States . . . . The world that 
television and newspapers offer to their black audience is almost 
totally white.’”322 
The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that “motion pictures 
possess a greater capacity for evil, particularly among the youth of a 
community, than other modes of expression,” and that “because of its 
strong and abiding interest in youth, a State may regulate the 
dissemination . . . of . . . material objectionable [to juveniles that] a 
                                                                                                                 
 318. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576–77 (1977). 
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 320. See generally id. 
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State clearly could not regulate as to adults.”323 The Court has also 
recognized that society has the right to “adopt more stringent controls 
on communicative materials [and general dissemination of speech] 
available to youths than those available to adults” because children 
do not have the full capacity for individual choice that is a 
presupposition of First Amendment guarantees.324 Courts have 
upheld several regulations that limit radio, broadcast television, and 
cable television to protect children—who are likely listeners or 
viewers—from indecent and offensive material.325 Courts should 
expand the regulations to cover material that promotes discrimination 
against minorities. 
For example, in Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis 
County, the Eight Circuit agreed that the state had a compelling 
interest in protecting the “psychological well-being of minors” by 
reducing the harm that children suffered when playing violent video 
games.326 But, the court clarified that the government must defend its 
restrictions on speech with more than abstract arguments or the 
possibility of the existence of a “disease sought to be cured.”327 The 
government must “demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not 
merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate the 
harms in a direct and material way.”328 The government cannot 
suppress ideas and images that the legislative body thinks are 
unsuitable for children without showing “substantial supporting 
evidence” that the harm will justify a law that threatens speech.329 
The court found that a single psychologist referencing his study, 
which indicated that playing violent video games “does in fact lead to 
aggressive behavior . . . [and] more aggressive thoughts,” is a vague 
generality that does not prove that the violent video games are 
psychologically deleterious.330 
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In order to achieve diverse programming, race-neutral casting calls 
must be required to provide minorities an opportunity to influence the 
entertainment industry. But unlike the Interactive Digital Software 
court, the FCC has already recognized that the viewing and listening 
public suffers when minorities are underrepresented among owners 
of television and radio stations: 
Acute underrepresentation of minorities among the owners of 
broadcast properties is troublesome because it is the licensee who is 
ultimately responsible for identifying and serving the needs and 
interests of his or her audience. Unless minorities are encouraged to 
enter the mainstream of the commercial broadcasting business, a 
substantial portion of our citizenry will remain underserved and the 
larger, [nonminority] audience will be deprived of the views of 
minorities.331 
The Supreme Court has also stated that it is widely believed that a 
diverse student body promotes educational excellence “even though 
it is hard to know how, and when, and even if, this informal ‘learning 
through diversity’ actually occurs.”332 The concept of a diverse 
student body can be applied to diverse television because minority 
viewpoints in programming serve not only the needs and interests of 
the minority community but also enriches and educates the 
nonminority audience, which is a key objective of the 
Communications Act of 1934 and the First Amendment.333 
Thus, a regulation requiring race-neutral casting calls supports the 
government’s compelling interest to protect children who “may not 
be able to protect themselves” from indecent speech or 
discriminatory speech, which is likely to have a much “deeper and 
more lasting negative effect on a child than on an adult.”334 Although 
Interactive Digital Software did not uphold the regulation, it provided 
a standard of review that can be applied to discriminatory films.335 
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Section I has already proven that representation is low,336 and the 
number of examples of racism in the world are easily available 
through a Google search.337 
Broadcast television is uniquely accessible to children—even those 
too young to read338—and must be regulated responsibly by the 
government. Other forms of offensive expression may be withheld 
from the young without restricting the expression at its source, such 
as bookstores and motion-picture theaters where the owners can 
prohibit children from accessing indecent material or physically 
separate the indecent material from unwilling audiences.339 But the 
ease with which children can obtain access to discriminatory images 
on television justifies requiring the entertainment industry to give 
people of color a chance to audition for films to provide a diverse 
cast. Moreover, many actors and actresses become writers and 
directors in the future,340 and the more opportunity provided to 
minorities to enter the field, the more likely that television will 
include a variety of perspectives. 
In fact, evidence presented by Congress and the FCC has 
determined that an owner’s minority status (a) “influences the 
selection of topics for news coverage and the presentation of editorial 
viewpoint, especially on matters of particular concern to minorities”; 
(b) has a special impact on the way in which images of minorities are 
presented; and (c) makes it more likely that minorities will be 
employed in managerial and other important roles where they can 
have an impact on station policies.341 The policies adopted by the 
FCC to promote diversity in programming and equal employment 
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opportunity through minority ownership policies are “a product of 
analysis rather than a stereotyped reaction.” 342 
Moreover, “[t]he type of reasoning employed by the FCC and 
Congress is not novel[] but is utilized in many areas of the law, 
including the selection of jury venires on the basis of a fair cross 
section[] and the reapportionment of electoral districts to preserve 
minority voting strength.”343 It is a small, logical step to conclude 
that including more minorities in the electromagnetic spectrum would 
likely produce a “fair cross section” of diverse content.344 The FCC’s 
logic should also be applied more widely to the entertainment 
industry to support race-neutral casting calls, which might be a key 
component to opening the door to more minorities in leadership 
positions and breaking the cycle of discrimination. 
Some free speech absolutists might argue that promoting diversity 
as a value among our children is not a compelling government 
interest, but past regulation and cases suggest otherwise.345 The Court 
has held that “the right of the public to receive suitable access to 
social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences 
[through the medium of broadcasting] is crucial, . . . and [the First 
Amendment commands that it] may not constitutionally be abridged 
either by Congress or by the FCC.”346 Broadcasters engage in a vital 
and independent form of communicative activity and should have 
wide journalistic freedom to exercise it, consistent with their public 
duties, to ensure that there is a balanced presentation of views on 
diverse matters of public concern.347 
In In Re Applications of Alabama Educational Television 
Commission, the FCC confirmed that promoting diversity on screen 
is a high priority in America.348 In Alabama Educational Television 
Commission, the court held that a company’s discriminatory policies 
                                                                                                                 
 342. Id. at 582–83. 
 343. Id. at 549. 
 344. Id. at 583. 
 345. Id. at 616. 
 346. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984) (quoting Red Lion Broad. 
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)). 
 347. Id. at 377–80. 
 348. See generally Ala. Educ. Television Comm’n, 50 F.C.C.2d 461 (1975). 
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can be inferred from conduct that displays a pattern of 
underrepresentation or systematic exclusion of minorities from the 
broadcast licensee’s overall programming, such as refusing to present 
members of an ethnic group or their views on the air or excluding 
minorities from the production and planning levels of 
programming.349 The FCC clarified that “the appearance of a black 
person on a program does not necessarily mean that the program is 
‘integrated’ in any meaningful sense or that integrated programming 
is the sole test of discrimination.”350 Ultimately, AETC’s renewal 
application was denied because there was no black representation on 
the various boards and committees responsible for the production, 
which the FCC held was a violation of its duty to serve the public 
interest.351 
When the FCC does not promote diversity, the court intervenes, as 
in Office of Communications of United Church of Christ v. FCC.352 
In United Church of Christ, WLBT’s renewal application for a 
license to operate a television station was granted with conditions 
despite WLBT’s proven racial and religious discrimination.353 In its 
petition, the Commission claimed that WLBT had failed to properly 
serve the community by failing to present a fair and balanced 
presentation of controversial issues, especially those concerning 
blacks, who compromised 45% of the total population within its 
prime service area.354 Nevertheless, the FCC made the political 
decision to allow WLBT to continue its operations based on its hope 
that WLBT would improve and on the community’s need for a 
properly run station.355 The Commission was willing to risk WLBT’s 
continuation of improper conduct for efficiency purposes despite 
WLBT’s failure to engage in the nondiscriminatory running of its 
                                                                                                                 
 349. Id. at 465–66, 468. 
 350. Id. at 466. 
 351. Id. at 470. 
 352. See generally Office of Commc’n of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 
1966). 
 353. Id. at 999. 
 354. Id. at 998. 
 355. Id. at 1000, 1007. 
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television station.356 The Commission’s policy decision revealed that 
ad hoc determinations exist in the government, and the results are 
highly dependent on the value placed on the interests by those in 
power.357 Fortunately, the D.C. Circuit overturned the Commission’s 
conditional renewal of WLBT’s license and required a hearing.358 
In United Church of Christ, the FCC failed to equally weigh the 
interests of minorities receiving discriminatory programming or no 
programming against the interests of others in the community.359 The 
FCC seemed to not understand that the lack of diverse programming 
could negatively impact community members as a whole, and its 
actions would never have been reversed if members of the public did 
not take an active interest and spend the time, money, and energy to 
litigate the renewal of the license.360 The FCC’s actions showed two 
problems: (1) discrimination at the station and programming level is 
not being corrected despite the requirement that licenses be granted 
in the public’s interest; and (2) these safeguards are being applied in 
a biased manner because eliminating racial discrimination is still 
viewed as less important than other efficiency or access reasons.361 
Thus, a regulation that requires race-neutral casting calls is necessary 
to ensure that diversity is promoted on television so the youth of 
America can learn about other cultures from a less stereotypical or 
discriminatory point of view. 
Another example is in a dissent written by Justice Brennan where 
he quoted a study that stated “[words] generally considered obscene 
like ‘bullshit’ and ‘fuck’ are considered neither obscene nor 
derogatory in the [black] vernacular except in particular contextual 
situations and when used with certain intonations.”362 This 
generalization of black culture to justify the country’s inability to 
appreciate cultural pluralism is somewhat ironic because it imposes a 
stereotypical view on a particular racial group that suggests bias and 
                                                                                                                 
 356. Id. at 1007. 
 357. Id. at 1008. 
 358. Office of Commc’n of United Church of Christ, 359 F.2d at 1009. 
 359. Id. at 1004. 
 360. Id. at 1005. 
 361. Id. at 1000. 
 362. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 776 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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not actual cultural understanding. In fact, there are likely many black 
people who find the words “bullshit” and “fuck” offensive. To 
correct this stereotypical belief, it starts with how children perceive 
certain races, which is socialized through television. 
As the late President Kennedy stated, the civil rights legislation 
was created: 
to promote the general welfare by eliminating 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national 
origin in . . . public accommodations through the exercise 
by Congress of the powers conferred upon it . . . to enforce 
the provisions of the [F]ourteenth and [F]ifteenth 
[A]mendments, to regulate commerce among the several 
[s]tates, and to make laws necessary and proper to execute 
the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution.363 
A regulation requiring race-neutral casting calls supports President 
Kennedy’s ideas but also considers the argument for freedom of 
speech and expression by creating the three exceptions where the 
casting call can include race if character is essential: (1) to the 
storyline, (2) to preserve historical or regional accuracy, or (3) to 
maintain the network’s identity-themed programming. It is a 
reasonable solution that will nudge Hollywood in the right direction. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Supreme Court stated, “Standards are the means 
by which we state in advance how to test a law’s validity, rather than 
letting the height of the bar be determined by the apparent exigencies 
of the day.”364 Although the proposal might not be perfect as drafted, 
we need to start somewhere. Laws are not created in a day or in one 
law review article. It will take time for a final method of review to be 
established. For example, it took sixteen years for the modern 
                                                                                                                 
 363. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 245 (1964). 
 364. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 785 (1996). 
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obscenity standard to settle and forty years for the definition of a 
public forum to solidify.365 However, we know for certain that 
Congress, through statutes and regulations, has the power to respond 
to “an unfortunate reality.”366 As Justice Ginsburg stated in her 
dissent in Adarand, the unfortunate reality is: 
[T]he unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering 
effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this 
country. The United States suffers from those lingering effects 
because, for most of our Nation’s history, the idea that “we are just 
one race[]” was not embraced. For generations, our lawmakers and 
judges were unprepared to say that there is in this land no superior 
race, no race inferior to any other. In Plessy v. Ferguson, not only did 
this Court endorse the oppressive practice of race segregation, but 
even Justice Harlan, the advocate of a “color-blind” Constitution, 
stated: “The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this 
country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in 
wealth[,] and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all 
time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the 
principles of constitutional liberty.”367 
We see the effects of a system of racial caste that only recently 
ended in our workplaces, markets, and neighborhoods. As Justice 
Ginsburg explained in her Adarand dissent: 
Job applicants with identical resumés, qualifications, and interview 
styles still experience different receptions, depending on their race. 
White and African-American consumers still encounter different 
deals. People of color looking for housing still face discriminatory 
treatment by landlords, real estate agents, and mortgage lenders. 
Minority entrepreneurs sometimes fail to gain contracts though they 
are the low bidders, and they are sometimes refused work even after 
winning contracts. Bias both conscious and unconscious, reflecting 
traditional and unexamined habits of thought, keeps up barriers that 
                                                                                                                 
 365. Id. at 777–78. 
 366. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 272 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 367. Id. 
57
Chong: Back to the Drawing Board! Legislating Hollywood
Published by Reading Room, 2019
662 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:3 
must come down if equal opportunity and nondiscrimination are ever 
genuinely to become this country’s law and practice.368 
Thus, race-neutral casting calls are a small step in the right 
direction because it attempts to address the root of the problem, 
which is that the extremely influential film industry is priming the 
youth of our country with discriminatory, stereotypical portrayals. 
The regulation will hopefully increase diversity in Hollywood’s 
leadership and lead to more on-screen appearances of minorities on 
television and in the movies. But to achieve this, Congress must act 
first. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 368. Id. at 273–74. 
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